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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
------------------------------------------------------------
STEVEN L. MALAN, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
--vs--
JAMES C • LEWIS AND 
BRETT LEWIS, 
Defendants/Respondents. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 17606 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant was a guest passenger riding in an auto-
mobile being driven by Respondent, Brett Lewis.· 
The parties entered into a written Stipulation in the 
lower court stipulating as to negligence, contributory neg-
ligence, and damages. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Honorable John F. Wahlquist granted Respondents' 
Motion For summary Judgment. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant is requesting that the lower court's 
decision be reversed, and that a judgment be granted to 
- 1 -Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Appellant pursuant to the stipulated damages in the amount 
of $15,000 and costs. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
It was stipulated in this action in the lower court 
that the Respondent was negligent, the Appellant free from 
contributory negligence, Appellant's damages exceeded $15,000; 
and that, under the Utah Guest Statute, §41-9-1, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, the action would be barred. The prior Utah 
Supreme Court cases of Milligan v. Harward, 355 P.2d, 62, and 
Ricciuti v. Robison, 269 P.2d, 282, which are similar factual 
situations, would cause the court to have to deny recovery. 
The only issue to be decided is the present constitutionality 
of our guest statute. The trial court granted Respondents' 
Motion For Summary Judgment. 
The Respondent, through inattention, ran off the road, 
struck the guard rail, causing the Appellant to sustain com-
pound fractures of his right leg decreasing its length and 
requiring the wearing of a brace for the remainder of his 
life. His actual damages would be several times $15,000, but 
this was the extent that any insurance recovery could be 
collected from the driver, who is Appellant's cousin. 
ARGUMENT 
There have been numerous assaults on the so called 
"guest statutes" in various states and in the State of Utah. 
- 2 -
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This law had been enacted originally in 27 states between 
1922 and 1939 because of the lobbying efforts of the liability 
insurance companies. It now has been declared unconstitutional 
or repealed in 17 of those 27 states. Utah's Guest Statute, 
§41-9-1, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides in part as follows: 
"Responsibility of owner or driver of a vehicle to 
guest.---Any person who as a guest accepts a ride 
in any vehicle, moving upon any of the public high-
ways of the state of Utah, and while so riding as 
such guest receives or sustains an injury, shall 
have no right of recovery against the owner or 
driver or person responsible for the operation of 
such vehicle •••• Nothing in this section shall 
be construed as relieving the owner or driver or 
person responsible for the operation of a vehicle 
from liability for injury to or death of such 
guest proximately resulting from the intoxication 
or willful misconduct of such owner, driver or 
person responsible for the operation of such vehi-
cle: •. 
and §41-9-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, defines a guest as 
follows: 
"'Guest' defined.---For the purpose of this sec-
tion the term 'guest' is hereby defined as bsing 
a person who accepts a ride in any vehicle without 
giving compensation therefor." 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO THE UTAH GUEST STATUTE 
The Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the 
Utah Guest Statute as being in violation of the Equal Protec-
tion clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, of the 
United States Constitution, as follows: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United 
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, 
- 3 -
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are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No state shall make or en-
force any law which shall abridge the privileges or 
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny 
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws." 
and the Equal Protection Provision of the Utah State Consti-
tution in Article I, Section 2, as follows: 
All political power is inherent in the people; 
and all free governments are founded on their au-
thority for their equal protection and benefit, and 
they have the right to alter or reform their govern-
ment as the public welfare may require." 
and Article I, Section 7, Utah State Constitution, as follows: 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty 
or property, without due process of law." 
and the right to be compensated for injuries, as stated in 
Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution, as follows: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, 
for an injury done to him in his person, property 
or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this State, by himself or counsel, any civil 
cause to which he is a party." 
and the Uniform operation of laws provision in Article I, 
Section 24, as follows: 
All laws of a general nature shall have uniform 
operation." 
A recent 1978 Utah Law Review article by David K. Broadbent, 
page 509, discusses the Utah Guest Statute, "The Utah Guest 
- 4 -
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statute: Has It Over Stayed Its Welcome?" This article, on 
page 510, quotes Dean Prosser as follows: 
The typical guest act case is that of the 
driver who offers his friend a lift to the office 
or invites him out to dinner, negligently drives 
him into a collision, and fractures his skull, 
after which the driver and his insurance company 
take refuge in the statute, step out of the pic-
ture, and leave the guest to bear his own loss. 
If this is good social policy, it at least appears 
under a novel front." 
This article, further, discusses the guest statutes, 
their origin, and rejection, further, on page 510, as follows: 
"II. BACKGROUND OF AUTOMOBILE GUEST STATUTES 
A. Conunon Law Origins 
The development of the automobile early in 
this century made it necessary for courts to de-
termine the respective rights and duties of a 
driver and his guest. A small minority of courts 
held that only in cases of gross negligence would 
drivers be liable for injuries to non-paying guests. 
Such a standard was derived by analogizing auto-
mobile drivers to the conunon law gratuitous bailee, 
and reasoning that 'justice requires that the one 
who undertakes to perform a duty gratuitously-
should not be under the same measure of obligation 
as one who enters upon the same undertaking for pay.' 
The majority of courts rejected the bailment anal-
ogy, insisting that society has a greater interest 
in human life and limb than in preserving property. 
A host driver was consequently held by most courts 
to the stricter standard of reasonable care. 
B. Rise of the Guest Statutes 
The rational that one who undertakes a gratu-
itous task should be held to a lesser standard of 
care than one who receives compensation for his 
services was never accepted in more than a few 
courts. It did, however, become the policy under-
lying automobile guest statutes. Enactment of the 
- 5 -
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statutes in twenty-seven states between 1922 and 
1939 has been attributed to an intense lobbying 
effort on the part of liability insurance companies. 
" The Utah Guest Statute, enacted in 1935, was 
patterned after California's guest act and was in-
troduced to the legislature at the request of the 
insurance industry. The statute denies any right 
of recovery to automobile guests who are injured 
or killed due to the host's negligence unless the 
guest's injuries or death result from the willful 
misconduct or intoxication of the host driver. A 
guest is defined as one 'who accepts a ride in any 
vehicle without giving compensation therefor.' 
III. EQUAL PROTECTION CHALLENGES TO THE UTAH GUEST 
STATUTE 
In its purest form, equal protection of the law 
means that no group of individuals are 'classified' 
so as to receive treatment by the law different from 
that received by the rest of society. Recognizing, 
however, that classifications are inherent in any 
legislative act, courts have usually given latitute 
[sic] to state legislatures in formulating classes 
for separate treatment. With the exception of cases 
involving 'suspect classifications' or 'fundamental 
interest,' which require a greater degree of judi-
cial scrutiny, the United States Supreme Court, in 
deciding the constitutionality of various statutes, 
has applied a 'rational relation' test, also de-
scribed as 'restrained review.' Under this test, 
statutes pass equal protection muster as long.-as 
the classifications do not rest 'on grounds wholly 
irrelevant to the achievement of the State's ob-
jective' and do not result in 'invidious discrimi-
nation.' In extreme deference to legislative acts, 
courts have occasionally hypothesized legislative 
intent and purpose to sustain otherwise question-
able legislation. Because of this wide leeway 
granted to legislation and the failure of the courts 
to require a rational relation in fact between the 
classifications and objectives of a statute, the 
'rational relation' test has been characterized as 
offering 'minimal scrutiny in theory and virtually 
none in fact.' 
In recent years the United States Supreme Court 
has required a closer relationship between a statute's 
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classifications and its objectives. In McGinnis v. 
Royster, 410 U.S., 263 (1973), for example, Justice 
Powell's majority opinion inquired whether 'the 
challenged distinction rationally furthered some 
legitimate, articulated state purpose' and insisted 
that the state's purpose for the statute be nonillu-
sory.' In Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S., 71 (1971), where 
the Court purported to apply a minimum scrutiny test, 
equal protection was held to require that the clas-
sification 'be reasonable, not arbitrary, (and that 
it) rest upon some ground of difference having a 
fair and substantial relation to the object of the 
legislation • • ' At the same time, many state 
courts are more strictly scrutinizing legislative 
classifications that do not fall within the 'suspect 
classification' or 'fundamental interest' categories, 
and several courts have accordingly stricken state 
guest statute legislation. In Brown v. Merlo, 506 
P.2d, 212, for example, the California Supreme Court 
declared: 
Although by straining our imagination 
we could possibly derive a theoretically 
"conceivable," but totally unrealistic, 
state purpose that might support this 
classification scheme, we do not believe 
our constitutional adjudicatory function 
should be governed by such a highly 
fictional approach to statutory purpose. 
We recognize that in past years several 
Federal equal protection cases have embraced 
such an excessively artificial analysis .in 
applying the traditional "rational basis" 
equal protection test . • • • (But) we 
believe that it would be inappropriate to 
rely on a totally unrealistic "conceivable" 
purpose to sustain the present statute 
"Under this new test, characterized as traditional 
equal protection with bite, judicial deference to 
conjectural legislative purposes wanes as courts 
look for actual, articulated purposes." 
As is indicated in this article, there must be sane rea-
sonable factual basis or rational classification to deny citizens 
- 7 -
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equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1, 
of the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 2,of 
the Utah State Constitution, which give "equal protection" to 
all citizens. It, further, appears that this statute is in 
violation of Article I, Section 2~ of the Utah Constitution in 
that it does not have "uniform operation with other laws; and, 
further, contrary to Article I, Section 11, in that it denies 
regress to "every person, for an injury done to him in his 
person." It is obvious to anyone who has had any experience 
with personal injury litigation that this law is the "creator 
of fraud" and the collusion is between the defendant and his 
insurance company rather than the driver and the host guest. 
It is "ludicrous" to assume Appellant and Respondent agreed 
to have this accident so that Appellant would sustain in excess 
of $5,000 in medical bills and have a crippled leg for the 
rest of his life. 
The Michigan Supreme Court in Stevens v. Stevens, 355, 
Mich., 363, 94, N.W.2d, 858, discussed the injustice in allow-
ing a person to recover if their personal property were damaged 
by host driver as follows: 
The friends of the driver .•• must suffer 
injury at his hands without recompense, solaced 
only by the thought that, after all, the skull was 
cracked by a friendly hand . • . . Wl¥? Because 
the relationship between them was one of trust and 
friendship. No money had changed hands. If, how-
ever, not the neighbor himself is carried to town, 
- 8 -
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but rather his livestock to the slaughterhouse, 
many modern courts will permit full recovery for 
injury to the unfortunate animal through failure 
to use reasonable care for its safety. Is this 
one answer of an enlightened people to the hal-
lowed question: 'How much then is a man better 
than a sheep?'" 
The assumption by legislators that collusion would be 
created between driver and the host has no factual basis in 
reality. How many people would "plan an automobile accident" 
with the uncertainty as to the extent of injury to recover 
"easy money." With the discovery methods and rights of medical 
examinations by the defendant, the possibilities of some in-
surance company being victimized are at or less than zero. 
Any plaintiff can "fake injury" in any negligence action or any 
case, and the legislature has not yet decided to disallow all 
rights of recovery for all injuries because of this possibility. 
Why, then, is there any rational basis to say to the "slaugh-
tered guest" you cannot recover for the driver's wrongdoing 
because you were sitting in his car? In some situations in the 
negligence field an "invited guest" is offered a higher degree 
of protection than the general public, e.i., maintenance of 
premises, etc. 
Regarding the ability of our judicial process to avoid 
injustice and fraud or collusion claims, the California Supreme 
Court in Klein v. Klein, 376 P.2d, 70, stated as follows: 
"It would be a sad commentary on the law if we 
were to admit that the judicial processes are so 
- 9 -
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ineffective that we must deny relief of a person 
otherwise entitled simply because in some future 
case a litigant may be guilty of fraud or collusion. 
Once that concept were accepted, then all causes of 
action should be abolished. Our legal system is 
not that ineffectual." 
There have been numerous Utah Supreme Court cases con-
struing the guest statute in recent years. The most recent 
case is Strange v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d, 877, where the court was 
almost ready to "sua sponte" raise this issue on its own. our 
supreme court should now follow the decisions of several other 
states in holding that the guest statute is in violation of 
provisions of the constitution, mentioned herein. 
A recent annotation in 66 A.L.R.3d, 532, contains a general 
discussion of the constitutionalit.y of guest statutes and the 
trend in recent years. As of the writing of this article in 
1975, as indicated on page 566, several states have now held 
guest statutes to be in violation of the equal protection clause 
of the United State Constitution. California, in Brown v. Merlo, 
decided in 197~ in 506 P.2d, 212, declared the California Guest 
Statute to be unconstitutional at least in so far as it applied 
to guests other than the owner of the vehicle in question on 
the ground that it was in conflict with the state and federal 
constitutional guarantees of the equal protection of the laws. 
The court found there were two proffered justifications of the 
guest statute, the protection of hospitality and the elimina-
tion of collusive law suits but concluded that neither constitute 
- 10 -
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a rational basis for the different treatment actually accorded 
by the statute classifications scheme. 
As indicated in the A.L.R. annotation on page 540: 
"The arguments are myriad as to why guest statutes 
fail to achieve their stated purposes and purported 
justifications. It is difficult to find independent 
opinion in defense of the merits of these statutes 
and the commentators and law review contributors 
are particularly unanimous in condemnation of them." 
The State of Idaho, in the recent case of Thompson v. 
Hagan, 523 P.2d, 1365, decided in 1974 the Idaho Guest Statute 
was declared to be unconstitutional. 
The purported justifications for the guest statute pro-
meting hospitality, eliminating collusive law suits, and 
placing the automobile guest into parity with a trespasser on 
real property, were examined by the Idaho Court. The conclu-
sion was reached that denial to a motor vehicle guest of a 
cause of action against his host did not bear any rational 
relationship to any of those objectives. In this-case, the 
Idaho Court states, on page 1368, as follows: 
"To prevent the risk of fraudulent collusion, the 
Guest Statute eliminates a negligence cause of 
action for all guests. If, as the rationals sug-
gests, a host will agree to fraudulently state that 
he was negligent, there is nothing preventing him 
from stating that he was grossly negligent or in-
toxicated in order that the guest may recover from 
the insurer." 
- ll -
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The State of Kansas, in Henry v. Bouder, 1974, cited 
in 518 P.2d, 362, likewise held the Kansas Guest Statute to be 
unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the 
Kansas Bill Of Rights. 
THE UTAH GUEST STATUTE IS IN VIOLATION OF THE UNIFORM 
OPERATION PROVISION OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION 
The guest statute is contrary to Article I, Section 2 and 
Article I, Section 24, of the Utah State Constitution. As in-
dicated, Article I, Section 2 allows regress to "every person 
for injury done to him and his person." Article I, Section 24 
states that the laws must "have uniform operation with other 
laws." 
In a 1978 Wyoming case, Nehring v. Russell, 582 P.2d, 67, 
the Wyoming Supreme Court, with an identical constitutional 
provision guaranteeing "uniform operation of the laws," held 
that the Wyoming Guest Statute violated that provision of the 
wyoming State Constitution. The court, considering the "legis-
lative ends of hospitality and gratuity" stated, on page 78, 
as follows: 
We as well fail to see how total denial of 
recovery through the distinction the statute draws 
can rationally be found to promote the legislative 
ends of hospitality and gratuity. Even if at the 
time of passage of a majority of the existing guest 
statutes a lack of automobile liability insurance 
allowed a rational basis to be found, such justi-
fication has been eroded away by time and changing 
circumstances." 
- 12 -
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Concerning the argument that the guest statutes "prevent 
collusion," the Wyoming court, further, held, on page 79, as 
follows: 
. Yet in furthering this obvious legitimate 
state interest in the prevention of collusion, the 
statute eliminates all negligence causes of action 
for nonpaying passengers, a technique reminiscent 
of employing a cannon to kill a flea. Not only is 
such a method grossly over-inclusive, doing away 
with negligence actions for an entire class of 
persons solely because some portion thereof may be 
'tainted by the mischief,' it is impractical as 
well. If the mischievous parties would be tempted 
to commit perjury or aid and abet a false claim 
on the issue of liability to allow recovery, wouldn't 
they be just as tempted to lie about the payment of 
compensation for the ride and avoid the statute in 
that way? McGeehan v. Bunch, supra. Our judicial 
system is not helpless in this area, as it is well 
armed with numerous implements for prevention and 
detection of fraud including the penalties for per-
jury as well as the tools of cross-examination and 
various discovery devices. As stated in Emery v. 
Emery, 1955, 45 Cal.2d 421, 431, 289 P.2d 218, 225: 
'Courts must depend upon the efficacy 
of the judicial processes to ferret out 
the meritorious from the fraudulent in 
particular cases.' 
"By barring all suits by guest passengers for ordinary 
negligence, the guest statute exceeds all bounds of 
rationality and in so doing constitutes a denial of 
uniform operation under the Wyoming Constitution. 
By way of summary, we conclude that the dis-
tinction drawn by the Wyoming guest statute between 
those denied and those permitted recovery for in-
juries inflicted by ordinary negligence do not bear 
a substantial nor rational relation to the statute's 
ascribed purposes of promoting hospitality, protect-
ing against ingratitude, and preventing collusive 
lawsuits. we therefore hold that the Wyoming guest 
-13 -
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statute violates the guarantee of a uniform opera-
tion of laws established by § 34, Article I, Wyoming 
Constitution. Further, cognizant that the deter-
mination is ours to make, we conclude that in 
consideration of all the factors and any prior re-
liances involved, our holding should be applied 
prospectively only, i. e., to this action and all 
cause of action accruing after 30 days following 
the date of this decision." 
In 1975 the Nevada Supreme Court in Laakonen v. Eighth 
Judicial District Court, 538 P.2d, 574, concluded that the 
Nevada Guest Statute was in violation of Article I.V, Section 21 
of the Nevada Constitution, which provides, with identical 
language as Article I, Secticn 24 of the Utah Constitution, 
that "all laws shall be general and of uniform operation through-
out the state"; and that it, further, violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution. That court, on 
page 579, held as follows: 
We conclude, therefore, that the denial of 
recovery for negligently inflicted injuries to 
those who by chance fall within the provisions 
of NRS 41.180 does not bear a substantial and_ 
rational relation to the statute's purposes of 
protecting the hospitality of the host driver and 
in preventing collusive lawsuits. Such irrational 
discrimination cannot stand in light of the appli-
cable constitutional standards. It is ordered 
that a writ of mandamus shall issue, directing the 
district court to enter an order of partial sum-
mary judgment, declaring NRS 41.180 unconstitutional." 
The State of North Dakota in Johnson v. Hassett in 217 
N.W.2d, 771, decided in 1974, also, found their statute to be 
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unconstitutional that it did not operate uniformly because it 
gave special immunity from liability for ordinary negligence 
to a special category of persons. 
"EFFECT OF APPLICATION IF UNCONSTITUTIONAL" 
Another issue to be considered is assuming that our guest 
statute is declared to be unconstitutional, what retroactive 
effect would this ruling have? The case of Critchley v. Vance, 
575 P.2d, 187, was decided after the accident in the case at 
bar, which occurred on April 9, 1977. The general law is that 
a statute that is declared to be unconstitutional is void from 
the day of its inception and enactment and confers no rights, 
benefits to anyone after that date. 
The Idaho case of Thompson v. Hagan, 523 P.2d, 1365, 
squarely addressed this issue. The court, after declaring the 
Idaho statute to be unconstitutional, then, on page 1370, dis-
cussed the effect of this ruling as follows: 
Since this action involves a major change in 
a host's liability in a negligently caused auto-
mobile accident, the question of its applicability 
to past, pending and future cases must be addressed. 
In the case of Linkletter v. Walker, the United 
States Supreme Court made an exhaustive analysis of 
retroactivity of court decisions. rt was held that 
there are no constitutional requirements concerning 
retroactivity, and it is a matter of discretion for 
the state courts. Three different approaches to 
retroactivity can be identified. The first approach 
is the traditional rule which is derived from the 
concept that courts do not pronounce new law, but 
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only discover the true law. Under this approach 
there are no new decisions, but only clarifications 
of the true law which makes a decision applicable 
to both past and future cases. The second approach 
is the prospective rule. Under this rule a deci-
sion is effective only in future actions, and does 
not affect the rule of law in the case in which the 
new rule is announced. The third approach is the 
modified prospective rule which is a combination of 
the traditional and prospective rules. Under the 
modified prospective rule, the new decision applies 
prospectively and to the parties bringing the action 
resulting in the new decision; or, to the parties 
bringing the action and all similar pending actions. 
" To aid the courts in determining which rule to 
apply, Linkletter v. Walker set forth the following 
factors to be considered. First, the purpose of 
the new decision must be analyzed in connection with 
the question of retroactivity. The purpose of hold-
ing the automobile guest statute unconstitutional 
is to prevent guests from being denied equal pro-
tection of the law. The purpose would be served by 
applying the case to both past and future actions. 
The second factor is reliance on the prior rule of 
law. The possibility exists that hosts may have 
offered rides to guests relying on the protection 
of the guest statute from negligence actions. 
Additionally, insurance companies may have relied 
upon the guest statute in setting their rates. 
The factor of reliance is very strong in this 
action. The third factor is the effect on t~e 
administration of justice. This factor takes into 
account the number of cases that would be reopened 
if the decision that the guest statute is uncon-
stitutional is applied retroactively. 
After weighing the three factors, it is con-
cluded that the modified prospective rule should 
be applied in this action. The decision holding 
the guest statute unconstitutional applies to this 
action and all pending actions at the date of this 
decision, and it applies to all actions arising in 
the future." 
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As stated, the Idaho ruling applied to "this action and 
all pending actions at the date of this decision." 
The effect of a statute declared to be unconstitutional 
is discussed in 16 Am. Jur.2d, 724, §256, as follows: 
The general rule is that an unconstitutional 
statute, whether federal or state, though having 
the form and name of law, is in reality no law, but 
is wholly void, and ineffective for any purpose; 
since unconstitutionality dates from the time of 
its enactment, and not merely from the date of the 
decisions so branding it, an unconstitutional law, 
in legal contemplation, is as inoperative as if it 
had never been passed. Such a statute leaves the 
question that it purports to settle just as it 
would be had the statute not been enacted. No 
repeal of such an enactment is necessary. 
Since an unconstitutional law is void, the 
general principles follow that it imposes no duties, 
confers no rights, creates no office, bestows no 
power or authority on anyone, affords no protection, 
and justifies no acts performed under it. A contract 
which rests on an unconstitutional statute creates 
no obligation to be impaired by subsequent legislation. 
No one is bound to obey an unconstitutional law 
and no courts are bound to enforce it. Persons con-
victed and fined under a statute subsequently_held 
unconstitutional may recover the fines paid." 
The dissent in Thomas v. Union Pacific Railroad Company, 
548 P.2d, 624, states as follows: 
With that part of the main opinion, which 
permits the action to proceed, I concur. I dissent 
from that part of the opinion, which fails to strike 
down the guest statute. 
The guest statute was unconstitutional the day 
it was enacted, it has been since, it is now, and 
- 17 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it will continue to be so long as Article I, Section 
11, Constitution of Utah, reads as it does, to wit: 
All courts shall be open, and every 
person, for an injury done to him in his 
person, property or reputation, shall 
have remedy by due course of law, which 
shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall 
be barred from prosecuting or defending 
before any tribunal in this State, by 
himself or counsel, any civil cause to 
which he is a party.' 
The guest statute is blatantly contrary to this 
provision so much so it is a monstrous impudence. 
In 1935, the legislature attempted to take away 
an existing remedy for injury. leaving nothing in 
its place. Such, it had no power to do. All prior 
Utah cases upholding the guest statute should be 
overruled; and an announcement of the statute's 
nullity made, before any more damage is done to the 
hapless citizens of Utah, because of the invidious 
discrimination visited on unsuspecting citizens by 
this pretended law." 
A dissenting opinion in Critchley v. Vance, 575 P.2d, 189, 
stated as follows: 
. if implied repeal of the guest statute __ has 
not occurred by enactment of Chapter 41, Title 31, 
a residuum of constitutionally impermissible dis-
crimination remains against those automobile guests 
who receive 'the most serious types of injury.' I 
believe this unreasonable classification within a 
class, i.e., the class of 'guests,' is repugnant to 
Art. I, Sec. 2, Constitution of Utah. Also, it 
appears to me that singular irony obtains when a 
legal system permits less injured guests to recover 
though there is no negligence while the seriously 
injured guest cannot recover when there is negli-
gence." 
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With 17 of 27 states having either declared their guest 
statute to be unconstitutional or with it having been repealed 
by the legislatures, it is apparent that this law creates un-
just discrimination; and that this classification cannot be 
permitted under the United States Constitution and the Utah 
State Constitution, as stated herein. 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the Utah Guest Statute 
should be declared unconstitutional for the reasons stated 
herein, and that the lower court judgment be reversed; and the 
Appellant granted a judgment in the stipulated amount of 
$15,000 and costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
~· 
MU~:/. 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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